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Introduction 
 
The Brexit vote in the UK, 
according to Andrés 
Rodríguez-Pose (2018), is 
an instance of the revenge of 
the ‘places that don’t matter’. 
This expression of discontent 
from places at the sharp end 
of rising social and spatial 
inequalities has fostered the 
rapid rise of populism that is 
challenging the hegemony of 
neoliberal capitalism and 
liberal democracy. This 
paper considers the 
problems of these so-called 
‘left-behind’ places – typically 
former industrial regions. 
Such places figured 
prominently not just among 
those that voted leave in the 
Brexit referendum in the UK, 
but also among those who 
voted for Donald Trump in 
the 2016 in the US, and for 
Marine Le Pen in 2017 in 
France in their respective 
presidential elections. In this 
context, this paper’s aims are 
fourfold. First, we outline the 
political economy of ‘left-
behind’ regions. Second, we 
offer a critical account of 
recent efforts to ‘regenerate’ 
deindustrialised regions. 
Third, we describe new 
policy prescriptions for ‘left-
behind’ regions attracting the 
attention of policymakers. 
Finally, the politics of local 
and regional economic 
development are considered, 
including the kinds of 
institutions are required to 
affect a new economic future 
in such disadvantaged 
places1.  
 
The regional political 
economy of de-
industrialisation 
 
Beatty and Fothergill (2018) 
estimate that 16 million 
people live in the former 
industrial regions of the UK – 
almost one quarter of the 
national population. While 
these regions have shared in 
the rise in employment in 
recent years, growth rates in 
London and other cities have 
been three times faster. 
Despite prolonged and far-
reaching deindustrialisation, 
these places still have a 
higher than national average 
share of industrial jobs, lack 
white-collar and graduate-
level jobs, have lower than 
average pay and 
employment rates, are more 
dependent on in-work and 
especially incapacity 
benefits, and have ageing 
populations. Headline 
unemployment figures 
provide a poor measure of 
real economic conditions in 
these places. Considering 
their high dependence upon 
incapacity benefits paid to 
those classified as unable to 
seek work, Beatty and 
Fothergill estimate the ‘real’ 
unemployment rates in such 
places to be 7.5% of the 
working age population in 
spring 2017.  
 
Educational disadvantage is 
concentred in left-behind 
places (Education Policy 
Institute, 2018). This 
disadvantage takes complex 
and varied forms. For 
instance, the North East 
region consistently has 
amongst the best primary 
school results in the country, 
but the lowest average adult 
incomes (Children’s 
Commissioner for England, 
2018). In addition, left-behind 
regions experience 
disproportionate levels of 
premature mortality (Plümper 
et al. 2018). Mordechai et al. 
(2018) have identified higher 
opioid prescription rates in 
the north of England and in 
areas of greater social 
deprivation. The highest 
incidence of relative urban 
decline is primarily located in 
Northern England (Pike et al. 
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2016). Such places are 
characterised by lower rates 
of net in-migration of 
economically active age 
groups, lower rates of 
employment growth in the 
decade to 2008, and a higher 
rate of contraction following 
the economic crisis and 
downturn in 2009-2012. They 
have substantially higher 
rates of poverty measured by 
the unadjusted means-tested 
benefits rate. The factors 
most strongly associated 
with relative decline in the UK 
are skill levels, industrial 
history and location at city, 
regional and national scales. 
City size and the reduced 
presence of consumer 
services in places that are 
over-shadowed by larger 
neighbours are key 
differentiating factors 
between places in relative 
decline. Some places with 
weak economies and lower 
value housing markets 
experience both selective 
out-migration of higher 
educated people and 
selective in-migration of 
disadvantaged, often unwell, 
people with high levels of 
social need (O’Connor, 
2017). 
 
Former industrial regions 
have presented a persistent 
problem for public policy 
across the developed world 
for several decades. While 
the rapid decline or 
disappearance of 
employment in traditional 
industries has occurred 
across North America and 
Europe, the scale of these 
changes has been especially 
marked in the UK and adds to 
the urgency of the issue. The 
UK’s ‘productivity puzzle’ 
continues to vex 
policymakers (Haldane, 
2017). There is a geography 
to this; McCann (2016) 
shows that regions outside of 
London and the South have 
productivity levels akin to 
poorer regions in Central and 
Eastern Europe and 
southern regions in the 
United States. 
Deindustrialisation has 
underpinned the long-term 
growth of regional 
inequalities in the UK 
(Tomlinson, 2016). Such 
disparities have been 
exacerbated more recently 
by several geographically 
uneven trends, including 
skill-biased technical change 
which has disadvantaged 
those regions with low 
educational attainment; trade 
shocks arising from greater 
international integration of 
markets (Sandbu, 2016); and 
the rise of ‘residential 
capitalism’ in which 
economic growth is based on 
appreciating assets values 
(Ryan-Collins, et al. 2017). 
Left-behind places typically 
are the wrong side of such 
developments.  
 
Former industrial regions 
have been subject to waves 
of policy innovation and 
intervention. Under the 
Thatcher and Major 
governments, priorities 
included, first, providing 
financial and regulatory 
incentives to attract 
international manufacturing 
investment to the former 
industrial regions, enabled by 
the UK’s membership of the 
Single European Market. 
And, second, encouraging 
entrepreneurship through the 
promotion of enterprise 
based upon self-employment 
and business start-ups. The 
legacies of inward 
investment policy include the 
major industrial complexes 
built up by Nissan in 
Sunderland and Toyota in 
Derby. But many of these 
investments proved fragile; 
LG in Newport and Siemens 
on Tyneside withdrew their 
investments shortly after 
their high-profile openings. 
The fragility of such branch 
plant economies is long-
established (Pike, et al. 
2017). Stirrings of economic 
nationalism and even ‘de-
globalisation’, have rendered 
strategies based upon the 
continued attraction of flows 
mobile manufacturing 
investment more difficult for 
UK regions, especially in the 
uncertain context of Brexit 
and future trading relations. 
Enterprise policy typically 
stimulated unsustainable 
market entry by short-lived 
businesses, displacing 
incumbents (Storey et al. 
2008), and encouraged 
‘reluctant entrepreneurs’ into 
starting low-value service 
enterprises (Turner 2003). 
While rising productivity 
means existing employers 
are likely to shed workers to 
remain competitive; indeed, 
some consider the remaining 
jobs in ‘left-behind’ places 
especially vulnerable to 
automation (Centre for 
Cities, 2018). 
In this context, there has 
been a search for new 
approaches to economic 
development.  Currently, a 
powerful orthodoxy suggests 
that cities offer productivity 
and growth premiums 
because they generate 
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agglomeration economies 
through their scale, density 
and diversity. In this way, 
London acts as the dynamo 
that powers the UK 
economy, through its 
financial, digital and 
knowledge-intensive 
business services (KIBS) 
and provides an economic 
development model to which 
other places should aspire. 
The recent growth of 
Manchester, based on the 
expansion of services and 
property development, has 
been presented as the model 
for other city-regions (Moran, 
et al., 2018).  
Public policy now aims to 
facilitate the further growth of 
large cities – typically by 
easing planning restrictions 
to allow more development. 
Recently, city-centre 
regeneration has acted as a 
proxy for industrial strategy 
(Berry, 2018). The Northern 
Powerhouse, for instance, 
operates primarily as a brand 
for the marketing of Northern 
England for investment in 
residential and commercial 
real estate, infrastructure, 
and, to a lesser extent, 
advanced manufacturing, 
R&D, and culture (Lee, 
2017). This development 
model lies behind the recent 
push to create ‘metro-
mayors’ in city-regions as the 
government’s preferred form 
of devolution based upon 
matching decision-making 
with ‘functional economic 
areas’ (Moran et al., 2018). 
The implications of this 
strategy for former mill 
towns, mining villages, 
coastal and rural settlements 
have been ambiguous at 
best. Widening social and 
spatial inequalities between 
and within cities and regions 
are the accepted 
consequence of this 
approach and, for some, are 
the sign of a dynamic rather 
than lagging economy 
(Glaeser, 2013). Such 
interpretations underline 
views that see efforts to 
revive lagging industrial 
regions as having failed and 
being counterproductive; 
better to enable migration to 
London (or other large cities) 
where more productive jobs 
are plentiful (e.g. Leunig, 
2008).  
 
The limits of ‘regeneration’ 
 
Reeves (2018: 30) has 
cogently summarised the 
limits of recent policies: 
“[I]ndustrial strategy has 
tended to concentrate on 
cities as engines of growth, 
on property development, 
technological innovation and 
the high-productivity trading 
sectors. This approach to 
economic growth neglects 
middle- and low-paid workers 
in the low-productivity, non-
traded sectors, as well as the 
civic infrastructure required 
to develop research and 
innovation across the whole 
economy. It also tends to 
exclude rural areas and 
towns from the very wealth-
creating activity it is 
promoting.” 
 
McCann (2016) too has 
shown that there is little 
evidence that other regions 
benefit from London’s 
growth. Instead, fortuitously 
capturing the benefits of 
globalisation through its 
specialisation in financial 
services, the attraction of 
multinational companies, 
foreign investment and 
international migrants, and 
benefitting from rising asset 
values, London has 
effectively ‘de-coupled’ itself 
from the rest of the UK 
economy (see also Beatty 
and Fothergill, 2018). Very 
little of London’s growth has 
been driven by migration 
from elsewhere in the UK 
(McCann, 2016) 
 
Similarly, there is little 
evidence that faster-growing 
cities in the North are 
contributing to the growth of 
neighbouring places. The 
economic performance of 
cities is crucially determined 
by the region in which they 
are located. Cities in 
southern England and 
Scotland have tended to 
grow above the national 
average, while cities in 
northern England grew more 
slowly (McCann, 2016). 
Although the gap between 
major cities and their regional 
hinterlands has widened, 
much of the growth, even in 
relative success stories such 
as Manchester, has been in 
low productivity, low wage 
sectors rather than KIBS. 
Moreover, with their greater 
social needs and higher 
costs of service provision, 
local authorities in ‘left-
behind’ places have borne 
the brunt of austerity since 
2010 (Bounds, 2017). 
 
The appreciation of asset 
values – principally land and 
housing – is major driver of 
the accumulation of wealth in 
London and the south east of 
England. Allocating land for 
residential development and 
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ensuring sites are properly 
supplied with infrastructure is 
perhaps the greatest policy 
challenge in southern 
England, which is 
experiencing a severe crisis 
of housing affordability. 
Capturing some of the gains 
of rising land values to fund 
the construction of 
infrastructure has emerged 
as the focus for urban 
development policy in 
London. UK planning policy 
is mainly focused on 
increasing the supply of 
housing in places where 
demand is high, but where 
local authorities are reluctant 
give permission for 
development. But housing 
and land markets in left-
behind places, outside the 
major city centres, are in a 
very different position. In 
weaker markets, 
housebuilding is constrained 
by an absence of 
development and mortgage 
finance, complex land 
viability issues including a 
surplus of brownfield sites, 
lack of subsidies for 
remediation and negative 
reputations and stigma. 
These conditions highlight 
the limits of ‘national’ 
planning reforms as a means 
of regeneration in left-behind 
places (McGuinness, et al. 
2018) 
 
 
Developing ‘left-behind’ 
places 
 
Geographical inequalities 
continue to increase, 
generating social, political 
and economic costs. Recent 
studies from the 
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and 
International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), among others, 
suggests that inequality is 
the cause of slow growth 
rather than its outcome 
(Cigano, 2014; IMF, 2017; 
Ostry et al., 2016; see also 
Stiglitz, 2015). In the US, the 
Brookings Institution has 
argued that places 
disconnected from economic 
opportunity “may hold back 
collective growth and 
threaten the social fabric on 
which a healthy democracy 
depends” (Berube and 
Murray, 2018: 2). Growing 
urban and regional divides 
are one expression of this. 
But, policy-makers’ 
continued faith in 
agglomeration and densely-
developed cities as the route 
to economic development is 
being challenged by 
research suggesting that 
large cities are not always 
the most dynamic engines of 
growth (Dijkstra et al., 2013). 
In the UK, the productivity 
growth of southern service-
based cities has been 
modest, slowing any 
increases in national average 
productivity, despite higher 
levels of skills and the 
presence of KIBS. Some 
smaller and medium-sized 
cities have outperformed 
larger cities (Martin et al. 
2018). Indeed, the OECD 
has cautioned against only 
focusing on the largest ‘core 
cities’, suggesting:   
“Larger cities create benefits, 
but as benefits grow, so do 
‘agglomeration costs’ ... 
costs and benefits increase 
in parallel, reducing the pull 
of larger cities … a well-
connected ‘megaregion’ with 
rural areas and a network of 
smaller, but well-connected 
cities, could provide 
agglomeration benefits while 
limiting the costs from 
congestion and densification” 
(OECD, 2018: 86). 
 
Given this geographical 
differentiation of economic 
conditions, place-based 
approaches offer a novel 
approach to local and 
regional economic 
development. Such 
approaches aim to release 
untapped potential in 
economically lagging places 
by empowering local 
stakeholders to maximise 
their skills, talent and 
capabilities in ways that 
enhance economic 
performance and potential 
(Barca et al. 2012).  
 
Such strategies tailor their 
mix of policies to local 
conditions, improving 
opportunities for citizens and 
workers wherever they live 
through a combination of 
targeted development 
strategies and institutional 
and capability improvements 
(Immarino et al., 2018). The 
World Bank calls for regions 
to act as the architects and 
implementers of their own 
programmes to address their 
locally unique capabilities 
and challenges, while 
acknowledging this will 
require more intensive, on-
the-ground support, including 
technical assistance and 
capacity building at the 
regional and the local level 
(Farole, et al, 2018: 11). 
Conventional approaches to 
economic development that 
focus solely on increasing 
economic growth have had 
limited impact in ‘left-behind’ 
places. Economic growth has 
typically not translated into 
rising living standards, with 
households which have seen 
declining real incomes and 
people trapped in low value 
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and poorly paid jobs that 
sustain in-work poverty, 
suggesting the need for more 
rounded forms of 
development that focus on 
human wellbeing (Stiglitz et 
al., 2010). 
 
The pursuit of major inward 
investments, development of 
KIBS or advanced 
manufacturing are unlikely to 
create inclusive growth in 
‘left-behind’ places (Lee, 
2018). Low-paid and 
precarious forms of work in 
mundane sectors of the 
economy – what Reeves 
(2018) calls the ‘everyday 
economy’ – have been 
neglected in debates about 
local industrial strategy. But 
these sectors are present in 
all local and regional 
economies and are 
disproportionately important 
in ‘left-behind’ places. Such 
sectors typically comprise 
the ‘foundational economy’  
that are immobile and 
relatively protected from 
competition but provide the 
social and material 
infrastructure of civilised life 
that everyone needs to 
access irrespective of 
income, including water, gas 
electricity, housing, health, 
care, and education 
(Foundational Economy 
Collective, 2018).  
 
Rather than competing for 
the next big thing against 
already strong and larger 
urban economies, ‘left-
behind’ regions would be 
better served by policies 
aimed at securing their 
foundational economies. 
Public investments in high 
quality infrastructures are 
likely to be important in 
places where the private 
sector is weak, especially if 
these are aimed at 
addressing underlying social 
problems such as high levels 
of morbidity or low levels of 
educational attainment. 
Strategies might include 
asset-based forms 
community development that 
aim to increase and broaden 
capital ownership to anchor 
jobs locally and strategies of 
‘remunicipalisation’ to take 
local infrastructure back into 
local control (CLES, 2017; 
Cumbers, 2016). The 
Industrial Strategy 
Commission (2017) has 
proposed the notion of 
Universal Basic 
Infrastructure to ensure 
appropriate provision of both 
the hard (physical and 
natural capital) and soft 
(human capital-building) 
infrastructures that increase 
the productive capacity of all 
people and places. The 
Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, (see Crisp et al, 
2018), for instance, has 
shown how reliable and 
affordable local bus services 
are crucial to the economic 
development of left-behind 
areas, and emphasised the 
need for institutional and 
regulatory reform to support 
improvements in provision. 
Easing austerity and fiscal 
stress is a precursor to the 
adoption of these 
approaches and 
reinstatement of local 
governments and their 
partners to lead, formulate 
and implement fresh thinking 
about local and regional 
development. 
Complementary demand-
side measures can also have 
positive impacts upon job 
creation and more inclusive 
forms of growth (Pike et al. 
2017).   
 
The politics of local and 
regional economic 
development  
                        
Deindustrialised places in the 
UK experience concentrated 
social and economic 
disadvantage, and this has 
profound political 
consequences, as the 
geography of the Brexit vote 
revealed. Similar problems 
are observable in the US, EU 
and elsewhere. In the UK, 
existing, top-down policy 
frameworks have largely 
failed ‘left-behind’ regions 
and there is an urgent need 
for new thinking on future 
development strategies. 
Place-based approaches can 
aim at (re)building and 
enhancing the everyday and 
foundational economy, the 
improvement of basic 
infrastructures, accumulation 
of locally-owned assets and 
the stimulation of demand-
side policies. Such 
approaches will require more 
participatory, multi-
stakeholder and deliberative 
models of decision-making 
because they are based on 
identifying and responding to 
diverse local and regional 
conditions. Consequently, 
place-based forms of 
economic development 
require strengthened 
institutional frameworks. 
Tackling the entrenched 
problems of ‘left-behind’ 
places will require more 
imaginative and flexible 
geographies than the 
centrally imposed approach 
to devolution which has 
fetishised city-regions and 
implanted metro-mayors 
(Tomaney, 2016). Such 
institutional arrangements 
need to respond to emergent 
international patterns and 
dynamics of geographical 
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change, including urban 
archipelagos, patchworks, 
and mosaics rather than 
simple binary cores and 
peripheries. The new 
theories of urban and 
regional development 
suggest the importance of 
the regional scale in 
addressing links between 
dynamic and large cities and 
the ‘left behind’ within urban 
hinterlands, smaller cities, 
towns and coastal and rural 
areas (OECD, 2017).  
 
Tackling the problems of the 
left-behind places requires a 
new politics of redistribution. 
Wealth taxes are likely to 
provide the necessary 
resources. Britain’s wealth is 
increasingly tied up in land 
and property. The value of 
the UK’s housing stock was 
£7.14 trillion in 2017, but 
64% of the UK’s housing 
wealth is located in London 
and the South East. 
Moreover, 87% of the growth 
in the value of housing over 
the 10 years to 2017 
occurred there (Savills, 
2018). Quantitative easing 
and bank bailouts have 
underpinned asset 
appreciation, and this further 
benefitted London and the 
south (Gordon, 2016). A land 
value tax, which targets 
immobile assets and 
unearned gains in wealth, 
although politically difficult to 
achieve, with explicit fiscal 
equalisation measures, 
would lie at the heart of 
efforts to achieve more 
regionally balanced economy 
(Ryan-Collins, et al. 2017).  
 
Allowing the continued and 
‘managed decline’ of left-
behind communities or 
exhorting their residents to 
migrate (Leunig, 2008) are a 
political and moral dead end. 
People have a low propensity 
to move out of such places 
for a range understandable 
reasons, including the 
difficulties of relocating from 
low value and weak to high 
value and strong housing 
markets and the social pull of 
valued community ties 
(Rodriguez-Pose, 2018; 
Sandbu, 2016). Indeed, such 
strong social bonds are one 
of the defining characteristics 
of former industrial regions 
and the loss of identity 
associated the 
disappearance of old ways of 
life continues to shape 
economic, social, political 
and cultural attitudes and 
behaviours in such places 
(Warren, 2018). This 
suggests the case for a new 
‘economics of belonging’ 
(Sandbu, 2018) that 
recognises the value of these 
relationships and builds upon 
them to create new forms of 
economic activity.  
 
 
Endnotes 
1. Jennings and Stoker (2016) identify a distinction between ‘two Englands’ consisting of 
‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘backwater’ places. Their focus is on places in southern England, 
symbolised by the divide between cosmopolitan Cambridge and the backwater, former seaside 
resort, Clacton. The focus here is on former industrial regions.  
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